Sunday, March 17, 2013

The Rwanda Genocide



“Many of the mechanisms through which genocide was prepared, implemented and justified in Rwanda bore striking resemblances to those used during the twentieth century’s other major genocide, the Nazi Holocaust against the Jews.”
-Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda

While the UN has had successful interventions and a decent track record in handling situations such as conflict within a country, one mistake which resulted in thousands of deaths over the course of a few weeks. These deaths could have been prevented if aid was sent at the right time, along with countries admitting that genocide was taking place rather than considering it as a civil war.
                Located in central Africa, Rwanda was a Belgium colony until the 1960s. During the Belgian rule and even before, a divide separated the Hutu from the Tutsi, causing stressed relations between the two ethnic groups. The majority, Hutu, blamed the minority, the Tutsi for all of the social, political, and economic problems; along with the Hutu remembering how living under the oppression of the Tutsi was years before. As the country suffered from coffee prices falling during the 1980s, along with social and political problems, the Hutu started to exterminate a portion of the population—the Tutsi (Hintijens 241).
                Organizations such as the UN and the countries within the UN knew genocide was just a matter of time. Rwanda exhibited the signs of genocide, characterized by uprising in violence, a troubled past among the ethnic groups, the planning of violence, scapegoating, and preparation. Groups such as Human Rights Watch and the International Federation of Human Rights reported on mass killings already happening in Rwanda in 1993, while in 1992, the Hutu death squads were explained to the international community and their leaders were named, who were involved in the genocide two years later (Stanton 3).
                Along with Human Rights Watch and the International Federation of Human Rights, the UN went into Rwanda in April of 1993 to survey to their report of what was happening in Rwanda. In August of the same year, the UN came back with the conclusion that the genocide had already started with long term knowledge that the Hutu were going to do a mass extermination of all Tutsi. While giving the report, the term “genocide” was used, but the UN still brushed off the growing threat as a ‘civil war,’ rather than take steps to prevent genocide from taking place. Three months before the violence started, the commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) sent a telegraph warning the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations that genocide was looming in the near future. The commander also requested for permission to search and seize the weapons shipped to Rwanda for the Hutu militants, but was denied him the power to act, under the claims that it was beyond UNAMIR’s mandate to take such actions (Stanton 3).  
The massive outbreak of killing did not start until President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down in April of 1994. Within hours of his death, the Tutsi were targeted by the military, administrators, militant groups, and ordinary people and slaughtered in their own homes, schools, and churches (Verpoorten).   
Within two weeks, an estimated five to ten percent of the population was killed between the second week of April and the third week of May (Hintijens 241). But the Tutsi were not the only citizens being killed. Rather than killing on whim, identification cards were used (with one’s ethnicity on them) to determine who was and was not Tutsi, making the finding and killing simpler to do (Stanton 5). While Tutsi were the target of the killings, Hutus turned against themselves and would kill any Hutu that opposed the killing of the Tutsi, adding to the overall death toll of the genocide.
                The death toll for the Rwandan genocide is unknown, based on a lack of physical data in order to have an accurate total. But in order to get an estimate, comparisons have been drawn between the 1991 census and figures taken from the refugee campus after the genocide (Verpoorten). What estimates that have been used to find a total amount of victims has been determined by using the total amount of Tutsi from the 1991 census and figuring the growth in population between 1991 and 1994, how many Tutsi wound up in refugee camps and how many left the country completely (Verpoorten)          
                Lasting for 100 days after the assassination of President Habyarimana, an estimated 800,000 Tutsi and Hutu sympathizers died during the genocide.  Much of these deaths could have been prevented if the UN had done their duty and protected the Tutsi from being killed, but such did not happen.
                Not long after the mass killings started to happen after President Habyarimana’s death, UNAMIR watched the genocide start, but had no “mandate” to intervene. The forces within the country helped protect foreign nationals within the country until UNAMIR almost pulled out of Rwanda completely, leaving only a handful of troops behind (Genocide—Rwanda).
                The US’s response to the genocide in Rwanda was also slow and untimely regardless of being told from the start that genocide was occurring in Rwanda. Diplomats in the capital of Rwanda, Kigali, were telling the US State Department what was occurring within Rwanda. Regardless of the efforts made by individuals within the government, no actions were being taken, along with unwillingness to use the “g-word” (Stanton 8).
                After having just suffered such a loss of men in Somalia, the US was hesitant in sending troops into another country. Not wanting to get involved in another African civil war, new limitations were placed to limit how much effort and involvement the US put into UN operations (Stanton 8). But by admitting that genocide was taking place in Rwanda, the US would have to become involved and put an end to the genocide.
                While the US tried their hardest to avoid becoming involved in the genocide, the commander of UNAMIR wanted to become involved and put an end to the genocide. While troops had been available and on call to pull their own civilians out of the country before it became impossible to do so, but if UNAMIR had been able to combat the genocide, the death tolls would have not been as high as they were (Stanton 12). 
                The end of the Rwandan genocide came when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) managed to put a stop to the violence by the Hutus and take control over the country in July of 1994. But the damage had already been done; thousands were dead in the span of a couple of months while the international community watched.
                Almost two decades later, remorse from both the UN and the US have been felt for not intervening in Rwanda. Efforts have been put forth to prosecute the individuals involved with the genocide, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (UNICTR) and to a greater extent, the International Criminal Court.
                Almost two decades later, the UNICTR has been at work, prosecuting those involved in planning the genocide as the lessons from the disaster are being learned by not just Rwanda, but the international community. It would be too easy to say that genocide would never happen again in thanks to the lessons taken away from Rwanda, but tensions mount up and the warning signs are sometimes not heeded by the international community.


Works Cited

"Genocide- Rwanda." Genocide- Rwanda. N.p., n.d. Web. 16 Mar. 2013.

Hintijens, Helen M. "Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda." The Journal of Modern African Studies 37.2
(1991): 241-86. Print.

Stanton, G. H. "The Rwandan Genocide: Why Early Warning Failed." Journal of African Conflicts and Peace
Studies (n.d.): n. pag. Print.

Verpoorten, Marijke. "The Death Toll of the Rwandan Genocide." The Death Toll of the Rwandan Genocide: A
Detailed Analysis for Gikongoro Province. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 Mar. 2013.



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