“Many of the
mechanisms through which genocide was prepared, implemented and justified in
Rwanda bore striking resemblances to those used during the twentieth century’s
other major genocide, the Nazi Holocaust against the Jews.”
-Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda
While the UN has had successful
interventions and a decent track record in handling situations such as conflict
within a country, one mistake which resulted in thousands of deaths over the
course of a few weeks. These deaths could have been prevented if aid was sent
at the right time, along with countries admitting that genocide was taking
place rather than considering it as a civil war.
Located
in central Africa, Rwanda was a Belgium colony until the 1960s. During the
Belgian rule and even before, a divide separated the Hutu from the Tutsi,
causing stressed relations between the two ethnic groups. The majority, Hutu,
blamed the minority, the Tutsi for all of the social, political, and economic problems;
along with the Hutu remembering how living under the oppression of the Tutsi
was years before. As the country suffered from coffee prices falling during the
1980s, along with social and political problems, the Hutu started to
exterminate a portion of the population—the Tutsi (Hintijens 241).
Organizations
such as the UN and the countries within the UN knew genocide was just a matter
of time. Rwanda exhibited the signs of genocide, characterized by uprising in
violence, a troubled past among the ethnic groups, the planning of violence,
scapegoating, and preparation. Groups such as Human Rights Watch and the
International Federation of Human Rights reported on mass killings already
happening in Rwanda in 1993, while in 1992, the Hutu death squads were
explained to the international community and their leaders were named, who were
involved in the genocide two years later (Stanton 3).
Along
with Human Rights Watch and the International Federation of Human Rights, the
UN went into Rwanda in April of 1993 to survey to their report of what was
happening in Rwanda. In August of the same year, the UN came back with the
conclusion that the genocide had already started with long term knowledge that
the Hutu were going to do a mass extermination of all Tutsi. While giving the
report, the term “genocide” was used, but the UN still brushed off the growing
threat as a ‘civil war,’ rather than take steps to prevent genocide from taking
place. Three months before the violence started, the commander of the United
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) sent a telegraph warning the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations that genocide was looming in the near
future. The commander also requested for permission to search and seize the
weapons shipped to Rwanda for the Hutu militants, but was denied him the power
to act, under the claims that it was beyond UNAMIR’s mandate to take such
actions (Stanton 3).
The massive outbreak of killing did
not start until President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down in April of 1994.
Within hours of his death, the Tutsi were targeted by the military,
administrators, militant groups, and ordinary people and slaughtered in their
own homes, schools, and churches (Verpoorten).
Within two weeks, an estimated five
to ten percent of the population was killed between the second week of April
and the third week of May (Hintijens 241). But the Tutsi were not the only
citizens being killed. Rather than killing on whim, identification cards were
used (with one’s ethnicity on them) to determine who was and was not Tutsi,
making the finding and killing simpler to do (Stanton 5). While Tutsi were the
target of the killings, Hutus turned against themselves and would kill any Hutu
that opposed the killing of the Tutsi, adding to the overall death toll of the
genocide.
The death
toll for the Rwandan genocide is unknown, based on a lack of physical data in
order to have an accurate total. But in order to get an estimate, comparisons
have been drawn between the 1991 census and figures taken from the refugee
campus after the genocide (Verpoorten). What estimates that have been used to find
a total amount of victims has been determined by using the total amount of
Tutsi from the 1991 census and figuring the growth in population between 1991
and 1994, how many Tutsi wound up in refugee camps and how many left the country
completely (Verpoorten)
Lasting
for 100 days after the assassination of President Habyarimana, an estimated
800,000 Tutsi and Hutu sympathizers died during the genocide. Much of these deaths could have been
prevented if the UN had done their duty and protected the Tutsi from being
killed, but such did not happen.
Not
long after the mass killings started to happen after President Habyarimana’s
death, UNAMIR watched the genocide start, but had no “mandate” to intervene.
The forces within the country helped protect foreign nationals within the country
until UNAMIR almost pulled out of Rwanda completely, leaving only a handful of
troops behind (Genocide—Rwanda).
The
US’s response to the genocide in Rwanda was also slow and untimely regardless
of being told from the start that genocide was occurring in Rwanda. Diplomats
in the capital of Rwanda, Kigali, were telling the US State Department what was
occurring within Rwanda. Regardless of the efforts made by individuals within
the government, no actions were being taken, along with unwillingness to use
the “g-word” (Stanton 8).
After
having just suffered such a loss of men in Somalia, the US was hesitant in
sending troops into another country. Not wanting to get involved in another African
civil war, new limitations were placed to limit how much effort and involvement
the US put into UN operations (Stanton 8). But by admitting that genocide was
taking place in Rwanda, the US would have to become involved and put an end to
the genocide.
While
the US tried their hardest to avoid becoming involved in the genocide, the
commander of UNAMIR wanted to become involved and put an end to the genocide.
While troops had been available and on call to pull their own civilians out of
the country before it became impossible to do so, but if UNAMIR had been able to
combat the genocide, the death tolls would have not been as high as they were
(Stanton 12).
The end
of the Rwandan genocide came when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) managed to
put a stop to the violence by the Hutus and take control over the country in
July of 1994. But the damage had already been done; thousands were dead in the
span of a couple of months while the international community watched.
Almost
two decades later, remorse from both the UN and the US have been felt for not
intervening in Rwanda. Efforts have been put forth to prosecute the individuals
involved with the genocide, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (UNICTR) and to a greater extent, the International Criminal Court.
Almost
two decades later, the UNICTR has been at work, prosecuting those involved in
planning the genocide as the lessons from the disaster are being learned by not
just Rwanda, but the international community. It would be too easy to say that
genocide would never happen again in thanks to the lessons taken away from
Rwanda, but tensions mount up and the warning signs are sometimes not heeded by
the international community.
Works Cited
"Genocide- Rwanda." Genocide- Rwanda. N.p.,
n.d. Web. 16 Mar. 2013.
Hintijens, Helen M. "Explaining the 1994 Genocide in
Rwanda." The Journal of Modern African Studies 37.2
(1991): 241-86. Print.
Stanton, G. H. "The Rwandan Genocide: Why Early Warning
Failed." Journal of African Conflicts and Peace
Studies (n.d.): n. pag.
Print.
Verpoorten, Marijke. "The Death Toll of the Rwandan
Genocide." The Death Toll of the Rwandan Genocide: A
Detailed Analysis for Gikongoro
Province. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 Mar. 2013.
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